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Abstract: Friedrich Nietzsche and Iris Murdoch both argue that perceptual 
experience itself, not just evaluative reports on experience (viz. 
judgement), can be evaluatively significant, and that the best way of 
making sense of this claim is to say that experience is shaped by the 
concepts that subjects possess and deploy as situated historical agents with 
a stance upon the world. This paper examines the implications of 
Murdoch’s distinctive conception of value experience for the possibility of 
a value objectivism and what is sometimes called the ‘absolute 
conception’, which is implicit in many contemporary debates about thick 
evaluative concepts and in discussions of the interrelationship between 
Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche in the history of philosophy more generally. 
 
1. Introduction1  
Thick evaluative concepts include ethical concepts such as CRUEL, COWARD, GENEROUS. 
Such concepts are often seen as “first order” evaluative concepts, which, if we want 
to say so, pick out evaluative properties and determine thin deontic properties such 
as rightness and wrongness. As is well known, G.E. Moore held that the thin moral 
property of intrinsic goodness is neither reducible to, nor constituted by, natural 
properties, but that it supervenes or is determined by natural properties, and that we 
know which things are intrinsically good by means of intuition. To many philosophers, 
R.M Hare and Bernard Williams included (who both hold that thin evaluative concepts 
 
1 Aspects of the discussion in this section on the turn to thick concepts in the history of moral philosophy 
during the 21st Century draw on Bergqvist, A. (2016) ‘Thick Description Revisited: Tanner on Thick 
Concepts and Perspectivalism in Value Philosophy’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, The Virtual 




are not ‘world-guided’2) this is too extravagant. They find it doubtful whether any 
scientifically respectable view of the world can allow properties other than natural 
ones. Hare sought to make progress with the familiar qualms about Moore’s non-
naturalism about thin evaluative concepts by drawing a distinction between 
descriptive and evaluative predicates such that the content of judgements involving 
thin moral terms is found, not in their extension (which is held to be empty), but in 
the functional role they play in expressing our belief about the desirability of doing 
certain actions and not others. Philippa Foot, by contrast, sought to make progress by 
reversing the order of explanation or analysis between general and specific value-
terms.3 Foot argues that thin evaluative concepts should be understood in terms of 
substantive value-terms, the thick ones, where the latter are seen as inherently 
evaluative concepts that, if we want to say so, pick out “first-order” moral properties.  
In her remarkable 1956 symposium piece ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’,4 Iris 
Murdoch questions the very terms upon which the argument between Hare and Foot 
have been premised in a way that calls forth another category that is precluded by the 
traditional dichotomy between fact and value, between objective and subjective. With 
a focus on Hare, Murdoch aims to elucidate just why the disputants have gone wrong, 
 
2 Bernard Williams maintains that thick evaluative concepts are “world-guided”, in as much as the 
thoughts and judgements expressed by utterances involving terms such as ‘elegant, ‘garish’, ‘integrity’ 
are candidates for truth and falsity. At the same time thick evaluative concepts are also held to be 
“action-guiding”, in the sense that, as Williams puts it, ‘they are characteristically related to reasons for 
action. If a concept of this kind applies, this often provides someone with a reason for action’ (Williams, 
B. (1979) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London, Penguin: 140.) Williams’ caveat about the action-
guidance or practicality of thick evaluative concepts is arguably due to his reasons internalism:  S has a 
reason to only if there is a “sound deliberative route” from S’s “actual motivational set” M to (intention 
to) do the action. On this reading, thick evaluative concepts provide reasons only for those who endorse 
it (the value it may be used to ascribe) as part of one’s “insider” evaluative outlook. 
3  It does not matter for the purposes of introduction what is the precise relationship between 
predicates and concepts: I will use ‘term’ to stay neutral on this metaphysical issue for the moment. 
4  Murdoch, I. (1956) ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 




which is so much more satisfying than the simple demonstration that they are wrong. 
Her central claim is that moral disagreement can stem from a difference in worldview, 
questioning the very conceptual foundations of a given moral outlook, a vision of the 
actual world that shapes precisely what one takes to be salient and not in moral 
disagreement. Crucially, worldviews are comprehensive outlooks on reality, an unruly 
mix of evaluative and non-evaluative claims in complex interaction as a whole. 
Hare’s disagreement with neo-Aristotelianism is complex but the feature that 
Murdoch singles out as the most fundamental is Hare’s position that a “conceptual 
apparatus” is something that one adopts, and that adopting such an apparatus is 
distinguishable in principle from adopting a moral view, thus construed as a system of 
moral principles. 5  Hare’s view of morality involves a Kantian-like notion of 
universalisability applied to some prescriptive standard that we hold in a way that 
allows the speaker to choose her own standards, so long as we are prepared to hold 
it for everyone in principle. 6  Such universalised standards serve as a basis for 
prescriptive statements of the form “x is good” (translated as “do or choose x”). Foot’s 
attack on Hare is that a judgement cannot be identified as a moral judgement simply 
on the basis of formal characteristics such as universalisability and prescriptivity.7 
Instead, she holds goodness to be tied to human flourishing; what is common to moral 
 
5 Hare, R. M. (1965) Freedom and Reason, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
6  Hare’s use of the practical syllogism differs from that of Kant because, unlike Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative, we are not constrained by what abstract reason allows in selecting our standards on Hare’s 
analysis. For further discussion see, e.g., Beardsmore, R. M. (1969) Moral Reasoning, London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 
7 See Foot, P. (1959) “Moral Beliefs”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59, 83-104, and Foot, P. 




evaluations is simply that all good things are ‘of the kind to perform their function 
well’.8 
Using Murdoch’s conception of ethical vision as (all-encompassing) worldview, 
we can explain the difficulty as follows. Because fundamental moral disagreements 
may be more a matter of differences in structure of competing visions, one party 
cannot even see how the other ‘goes on’ to apply the term in question to new cases, 
or what might be the point of doing so. 
In his recent work on the relationship between Iris Murdoch and Nietzsche, 
Paul Katsafanas argues that understanding value experience as conceptually 
structured in perspectival and parochial ways implies a form of value constitutivism. 
Katsafanas describes the sought view thus:  
 
Perception doesn’t just attune us to important features of the environment, 
but constitutes the perceived environment in importantly different ways.9  
 
On this view, value is determined by an individual’s perspective – determined by the 
particular cultural-historical “life-world” and other contingencies of the cognitive 
background conditions that continually structure our way of seeing the world. As such, 
the concepts that are said to structure our experience must be assessed 
genealogically from within an engaged parochial viewpoint. In contrast, Murdoch’s 
 
8 pp. 68-59, Foot, P. (1961). In Foot, P. (1972) “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, 
Philosophical Review 81 (3), 305-316, moral evaluations are “hypothetical” in the sense that they serve 
an end (human flourishing) and will not be considered as reason-giving by those who do not share this 
end. 
9  Katsafanas, P. (forthcoming) “Nietzsche and Murdoch on the Moral Significance of Perceptual 
Experience”, forthcoming in the European Journal of Philosophy. See also Katsafanas, P. (2013) Agency 




account of moral value is that moral discernment is a matter of seeing things aright; 
as she puts it, goodness is ‘a refined and honest perception of what is really the case, 
a patient and just discernment and exploration of what confronts one, which is the 
result not simply of opening one’s eyes but of a certain perfectly familiar kind of moral 
discipline’.10 
Scepticism about Murdoch’s distinctive conception of value experience as a 
form of discernment of ‘what is there anyway” is often motivated by worries that 
directly connect with the concerns with G.E. Moore’s position with which we started, 
most famously articulated in John Mackie’s11 and Christine Korsgaard’s12 respective 
arguments to the effect that the only real moral realist there ever was in the history 
of philosophy is Plato. (Since Plato is allegedly the only metaethicist who has ever 
understood what moral realism would have to be like for it to discharge its explanatory 
obligations.) Platonist moral realism postulates a structure of the world that is non-
perspectival and inherently evaluative: 
 
a) It is non-perspectival in that it is not particularly attuned to our human 
perspective and its peculiarities.  
 
b) It is inherently evaluative in that cognitive contact with that reality is 
inherently motivational for a fully rational agent. (Note that this also partly 
explains the ancient conception of virtue as knowledge.) 
 
10  Murdoch, I. (1997) in Conradi, P. (ed.) Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and 
Literature, New York, Penguin Books, 330. 
11 Mackie, J. L. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London, Penguin Books. 






While Nietzsche is sometimes said to be a nihilist, I will assume that it can be agreed 
on all hands that scepticism about absolute, non-perspectival, value representations 
need not imply a global form of value scepticism: it can instead be relativized to some 
of our inherited ideas, notably the kinds of commitment that Platonism exemplifies. 
That leaves the door open for a positive account of other values that do not depend, 
directly, on a Platonic form of vindication. One popular such strategy in contemporary 
metaethics is neo-Aristotelianism, notably John McDowell’s dispositional account of 
value on a par with a dispositional account of secondary qualities.13 Other positive 
“subjective realist” accounts of value worth mentioning at this juncture are Bernard 
Williams’ internal realism,14 which fuels much of the recent turn to thick concepts in 
metatethics, and David Wiggin’s conceptual realism.15  
Williams sought to make progress with Moore’s non-naturalism about thin 
concepts, such as intrinsic goodness, by distinguishing two conceptions of ‘the world’. 
The first conception is of the world absolutely conceived as ‘what is there anyway’, 
the world of scientifically discoverable primary qualities (roughly). The second is the 
human world, the world of commitments that form part of human agents’ ‘subjective 
motivational set’ – desires, attitudes, and needs. Thick evaluative concepts occupy 
centre stage in metaethics due to what has been claimed to follow from them in the 
wake of the work of Bernard Williams who argues that: 
 
 
13 McDowell, J. (1979) ‘Virtue and Reason’, The Monist 62 (3), pp. 331-350. See also McDowell, J. 
(1996) Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 
14 Williams, B. (1979) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London, Penguin. Passim. 
15 Wiggins, D. (1989) Needs, Values and Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value, 3rd edition, Oxford, 




1. Thick evaluative concepts are “world-guided”; the thoughts and judgements 
expressed by utterances involving terms such as ‘cruel’, ‘generous’, ‘integrity’ 
are candidates for truth and falsity. 
 
2. Thick evaluative concepts are “action-guiding”; they are ‘characteristically 
related to reasons for action. If a concept of this kind applies, this often 
provides someone with a reason for action’. (my emphasis)16 
 
Williams’ strategy is to distinguish between two conceptions of ‘the world’, one of the 
world absolutely conceived as ‘what is there anyway’; the other of the world 
conceived as the meaningful life-world of situated historical human agents. Now 
consider his characterization of the overall theoretical vision in his later essay on moral 
intuitionism: 
 
Nevertheless, the nature of the shared practice shows that it is the world 
guided, and explanation will hope to show how that can be. What the 
explanation exactly may be, is to be seen: but we know that a vital part of it 
will lie in the desires, attitudes, and needs that we and they have differently 
acquired from our different ways of being brought into a social world. The 
explanation will show how, in relation to those differences, the world can 
indeed guide our and their reactions. ‘The world’ in that explanation will 
 
16 Williams, B. (1979), 140. Williams’ caveat about the action-guidance or practicality of thick evaluative 
concepts is arguably due to his reasons internalism:  S has a reason to only if there is a “sound 
deliberative route” from S’s “actual motivational set” M to (intention to) do the action. On this reading, 
thick evaluative concepts provide reasons only for those who endorse it (the value it may be used to 




assuredly not be characterized merely in terms of primary qualities; the 
account of it will need to mention, no doubt, both primary and secondary 
qualities and straightforwardly psychological items.17 
 
As I read him, Williams holds that the idea that concepts such as cruel and kind are 
‘world-guided’ is in fact not based on some appeal to emergence or supervenience or 
anything like that: Williams’ position is precisely not a new non-naturalism parallel to 
Moore’s initial account of how all and only things that are intrinsically good form the 
extension of the predicate ‘is intrinsically good’.18 Williams’ notion of thick concepts 
as ‘world guided’ instead turns on considerations about competence with thick 
concepts within a shared social practice. Many authors engaged in the contemporary 
debate about the thick have seized in on this aspect of Williams’s account and further 
hold the view that thick evaluative concepts are shapeless and exhaustive with respect 
to the non-evaluative features that ground them: 
 
Shapelessness of thick concepts: For any thick evaluative concept, there need not 
be any corresponding non-evaluative categorization or 
kind that unifies all and only the things that fall under 
that concept from one case of application to the next. 
What unifies all and only the instances of the concept 
(viz. kind), or what constitutes the real similarity shared 
 
17 Williams, B. (1995) ‘What Does Intuitionism Imply?’, in his Making Sense of Humanity, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, 182-91, 186. 
18  For further discussion and defense of this claim, see Harcourt, E. and Thomas, A. (2013) ‘Thick 





by all its instances, is evaluative. 
 
Outrunning (‘insiders’/outsiders’): The nature of the quality picked out by some thick 
evaluative concept is not determinable without using 
the concept in question; it is not independently 
discernible.19 
 
What thus emerges is a conception of thick moral concepts as playing a dual role in 
our moral thinking: Thick moral concepts trace out moral patterns in a nonetheless 
objective reality and at once guide action in a way that is bound up with appropriately 
developed ethical sensibilities. 20  On contemporary non-reductive moral realist 
versions of this claim beyond Williams’ internal realism, the “new” non-naturalism, as 
it were, thick evaluative concepts are (non-Platonically) inherently evaluative.  
A common view, shared by the otherwise diverse positions of moral 
constructivism, versions of subjective and internal realism, and Nietzschean 
constitutivism, 21  assumes that understanding value experience as conceptually 
structured in perspectival and parochial ways implies that value itself is constituted by 
the contingent conceptual commitments of one’s perspective. 22  Thus, much 
 
19 I borrow the term ‘outrunning’ from Väyrynen, P. (2013) The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study 
of Thick Concepts in Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press. See especially pp. 193ff. 
20 Bergqvist, A. (2013) ‘Thick Concepts and Context Dependence’, Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1), 
221-232. 
21 ‘Constitutivism’ is often used to refer to the view that the nature of value is fixed by the constitutive 
aim of action. But if I am reading Katsafanas correctly, he does not take constitutivism to imply anything 
about action having a constitutive aim. (I thank Michael Milona for this observation.) I should also note 
that Nietzsche’s own position is usually referred to as ‘perspectivism’. My use of the distinctive notion 
of ‘perspectivalism’ throughout this paper is partly motivated by this usage; it does not involve 
commitment to Nietzschean perspectivism. 
22  See Setiya, K. (2013) ‘Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good’, Philosopher’s Imprint 13 (9), 1-21; 




contemporary work on thick concepts in the wake of the work of authors such as John 
McDowell and Bernard Williams in metaethics often culminates in the claim that the 
meaning or sense of the intentional object of evaluative thought is anthropocentric 
(‘subjective’). In contrast, what we find in Murdoch is the robust realist claim that the 
salient concepts of an individual’s life-world can be revelatory of value. 
 
2. The Way Ahead  
My overall aim in this essay is to make good the robust realist claim that the salient 
concepts of an individual’s life-world can be revelatory of value without appeal either 
to Platonism or value-constitutivism. Drawing on Iris Murdoch’s model of value 
experience and moral vision as implying the notion of an all-encompassing 
‘worldview’, my central positive thesis is the claim that the relevant notion that value 
is always value for us be understood as a transcendental condition for experience itself 
rather than a determinant of the representational content of such experience. Along 
the way, I draw out the implications of this view for the possibility of a value 
objectivism and what is sometimes called the ‘absolute conception’, which is implicit 
in many contemporary debates about thick evaluative concepts. What the resulting 
view brings to the table is a conceptual framework that allows us re-consider the 
evaluative/non-evaluative distinction concerning the way that we think about the 
significance of the first-person perspective in ethics and the nature of thick concepts 
as practical concepts beyond the polarised dichotomies (between the evaluative and 
non-evaluative, the subjective and objective) that drive many of the objections to 
 
Press; Thomas, A. (2006) Value and Context, Oxford, Oxford University Press, and Thomas, A. (2012) 
‘Nietzsche and Moral Fictionalism’, in C. Janaway, and S. Robertson, (eds.), Nietzsche, Naturalism and 




robust non-reductive moral realism with which we started. 
 I begin (Section 3) by examining Murdoch’s account of moral perception in 
relation to the general thesis of cognitive penetrability in the philosophy of 
perception, the claim that the character of perceptual experience can be affected by 
another mental state of the perceiving subject. As we shall see, what we find in 
Murdoch’s distinctive account of evaluative appraisal in terms of what she sometimes 
refers to as ‘just and loving perception’ is not only the idea of being attuned to one’s 
environment thanks to cognitive penetration through the concepts that we deploy, 
but also the claim that one’s conceptions of these concepts decisively influence what 
we see. According to Murdoch’s notion of moral vision, when people disagree about 
moral questions, their disagreements do not partition cleanly into evaluative and non-
evaluative categories; it is rather that the disputants’ different worldviews generate 
conflicting narratives about the situation.  
The upshot of this discussion (Section 3) raises the explanatory desiderata for 
Section 4: how to understand Murdoch’s difficult claim that agents with dissimilar 
worldviews “see different worlds”. What assumptions do we need to add to the 
presence, or possibility, of variation in narratives and worldviews to make the slide 
from moral vision to value constitutivism seem tempting? I diagnose this as a problem 
concerning the relation between moral vision and non-perspectival value. I distinguish 
between two readings of the concept of ‘non-perspectival value’: an epistemic reading 
and a non-epistemic one. I argue that commitment to the thesis that value is in some 
sense always value for us does not as such rule out value being non-perspectival in the 





In Section 5 I address the relationship between the parochial and the 
perspectival. I argue that use of the notion ‘variation in perspective’ masks an 
ambiguity that betrays a deeper confusion between concepts and conceptions in 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism. On my reading, although Nietzsche and Murdoch both hold 
that there may be irreconcilable differences in competing moral visions (thus 
understood as conceptual schemes) this does not yet show that both authors hold 
that there is therefore no guarantee that we will arrive at a fully adequate, 
unproblematic set of concepts: the general non-Platonist claim that evaluative claims 
are ‘perspectival’ is ambiguous between a number of readings that we should be 
careful to distinguish.  
In developing my positive account of value experience as revelatory of value, I 
invoke the notion of transcendental narrative structure in moral experience (thus 
understood as implying an all-encompassing moral vision). I use the idea of narrative 
structure as an object of comparison with the aim of defending the further claim that 
the emphasis placed on context that is present in both Katsafanas’ and Murdoch’s 
accounts of value experience as always already structured by the concepts and 
parochial sensibilities is best understood as the claim that content-involving (and so 
rationality-involving) phenomena in human life is inseparable from point or purpose.  
In Section 6, I consider the possible objection to the resulting account as to 
how to account for the notion of structure and unity of moral thought: are there any 
limits as to what might plausibly be counted as “value for us”? As we shall see, this 
question is especially pressing if we follow through on the argument from the previous 
sections and take the central target notion of worldview to be an unruly holistic 





3. Murdoch on Rich Description  
In philosophy of perception the general idea of perceptual experience itself being 
evaluative has sometimes been discussed in terms of ‘cognitive penetration’, the 
claim that the character of perceptual experience can be affected by another mental 
state of the perceiving subject: the cognitive states and characters of perceptual 
agents can alter how they perceive the world.  It also relates to the more general idea 
that the character of perceptual states is theory-laden, in as much as the experiences 
we have are structured by our conceptual capacities and cognitive background 
knowledge. Potential cognitive penetrators include moods, beliefs, hypotheses, 
knowledge, desires, and traits. Thus, to borrow an example from Susanna Siegel, ‘it is 
sometimes said that in depression, everything looks grey. If this is true, then mood 
can influence the character of perceptual experience: depending only on whether a 
viewer is depressed or not, how a scene looks to that viewer can differ even if all other 
conditions stay the same’.23 
In some cases, cognitive penetration can be epistemically beneficial. This claim 
has recently been defended by Siegel. She writes: 
 
If an x-ray looks different to a radiologist from the way it looks to someone 
lacking radiological expertise, then the radiologist gets more information 
about the world from her experience (such as whether there’s a tumor) than 
the non-expert does from looking at the same x-ray.24 
 
23 Siegel, S. (2012) ‘Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification’, Nous 46 (2), 201-222, 202. 





Moreover, if cognitive penetrability by personal traits is possible we may also 
elucidate the intuitively plausible idea that having the right kind of traits typically 
makes a subject more sensitive to relevant features of her environment. 
Philosophically, the intuitive idea that can be traced back to the ancient moral 
philosophical dictum that “virtue is knowledge”, which has been the focus of more 
recent contributions to the literature on moral perception in the wake of Iris 
Murdoch’s and John McDowell’s respective work. As Siegel puts it: ‘If Iris Murdoch 
and John McDowell are correct in thinking that having the right sort of character lets 
you see more moral facts than someone lacking that character sees when faced with 
the same situation, then there too, your perceptual experience becomes epistemically 
better, thanks to its being penetrated by your character.’25 According to this view, a 
rash person will not perceive the danger in a situation where a courageous person 
would. 
Like Siegel, I find it helpful to think of Murdoch’s notion of ‘moral vision’ in 
terms of cognitive penetrability. I also agree that the epistemic claim that cognitive 
penetrability by personal traits (of the right kind) typically makes a subject more 
sensitive to relevant features of her environment is a good way of understanding 
Murdoch’s commitment to the claim that “virtue is knowledge”. While this aspect of 
Murdoch’s position, that adequate moral ‘vision’ may itself be conditional upon 
virtue, has been much discussed in the literature, I want to explore a rather different 
and, to my mind, more significant way in which perception can be ethically relevant. 
 




What we find in Murdoch’s distinctive account of evaluative appraisal in terms of what 
she sometimes refers to as ‘just and loving perception’ is not only the idea of being 
attuned to one’s environment thanks to cognitive penetration through the concepts 
that we deploy, but also the claim that one’s conceptions of these concepts decisively 
influence what we see. While R. M. Hare and others present morality as primarily a 
matter of choice, and treat moral disagreement as a matter of difference in the ways 
in which people ‘choose’ among alternatives, Murdoch advocates a shift in focus from 
the concept of ‘choice’ to the concept of ‘vision’: a person’s conception of salient 
concepts may restrict, or enlarge (and may focus in one way or another) the range of 
options that she is in a position to recognise as available for her to choose from.  Thus, 
Murdoch wants to deny that the person ‘chooses his reasons in terms of, and after 
surveying, the ordinary facts which lie open to everyone’. 26  Difference, then, for 
Murdoch, is not just a difference in application of shared concepts, but in the 
repertoire of concepts that different people understand and employ. The key claim is 
that adequate moral deliberation is conditional upon first getting your initial 
descriptions of the practical moral situation right. Thus, to borrow an example from 
Elijah Millgram, if you take someone to be distant and aloof, you may be rather 
‘standoffish’ yourself, but ‘once you come to see his manners as shy, it will be more 
natural to be more open towards him’.27  
As intimated in the introduction, part of the problem of finding the right 
description in Murdoch is the idea that moral conflicts, e.g., doing the brave thing or 
 
26  Murdoch, I. (1997) in Conradi, P. (ed.) Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and 
Literature, New York, Penguin Books), 327. 
27 Millgram, E. (2005) ‘Murdoch, Practical Reasoning and Particularism’, in Millgram, E. (2005) Ethics 





the honest thing, can be resolved by successful re-description (maybe the honest thing 
is the brave thing). The more controversial thesis is that getting the description right 
is itself an “evaluative” matter for which you are morally responsible, unlike the case 
of merely “factual” descriptions (like representing the wood anemones in the vase 
before you as being thus and so).   
Murdoch argues for this conclusion at length by her well-known example of a 
mother who comes to see her daughter-in-law in a new light as ‘refreshingly 
spontaneous’ (rather than juvenile and vulgar) through an active and conscientious 
effort to attend to the girl and see her “as she really is”.28 Let us set aside the issue 
whether Murdoch is right in assuming that such re-assessments are themselves 
expressions of ‘just’ and ‘loving’ moral perceptivity or if having the relevant vision is 
itself conditional upon virtue. 29  The important point for present purposes is the 
assumption that the mother-in-law’s conscientious effort to view the girl afresh in a 
way that also enables her to relate to her in a more sympathetic way points toward a 
moral improvement of some sort. What we have here is not just the reminder of the 
importance of keeping one’s mind open so that one does not overlook some 
interesting alternative ways of representing the circumstances. The claim is rather 
that you are morally required to adopt a critical stance because you could otherwise 
 
28 Murdoch herself is a Platonist Realist, but these remarks can be made consistent with a whole variety 
of views. Perhaps most obviously, the emphasis on activity, conceptual framework, and practical 
interests lies at the very heart of various pragmatist or ‘constructivist’ positions. But such ideas are 
equally central (though in a different way) with certain forms of realism and, in particular, the “anti-
representationalist” lessons that McDowell has urged on the back of his take on Sellars and 
Wittgenstein’s respective critical remarks about the mythical Given (which again yield internally 
different accounts). 
29 Murdoch, I. (1967), 17-19. For a similar idea that adequate moral ‘vision’ is itself conditional upon 
virtue, see Nancy Sherman’s discussion of moral perception, esp. pp, 28-44, Sherman, N. (1989) The 
Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue, Oxford, Oxford University Press. See also John 




miss those morally salient aspects that could actually make a difference to the 
appropriateness of one’s practical response. Thus, as Justin Broackes emphasises, 
Murdoch’s interest ‘is not just in the phenomenon of changing one’s mind about a 
particular case, but also in the processes of revision, of development and ‘deepening’ 
of moral vocabulary and conceptual scheme ([1964] IP 29/322, 31-33/324-326) and 
particularly, and most remarkably, in a kind of privacy of understanding ([1964] IP 25–
9/319–22)’ 30  – where the very subject matter of ethics is claimed to be all-
encompassing rather than limited to overtly “moral” concepts (such as ‘duty’, 
‘permissible’, or other evaluative standards for right conduct). As Murdoch expresses 
it in her 1967 Leslie Stephen Lecture: 
 
The area of morals, and ergo of moral philosophy, can ... be seen ... as covering 
the whole of our mode of living and the quality of our relations with the world.31 
 
On the face of it, Murdoch’s emphasis on thick description and, more importantly, re-
description of moral scenarios in perception bear striking similarities with Nietzsche’s 
account of the continuous process of revaluation. Revaluation consists in examining 
the practical considerations of a value commitment or concept in terms of whether it 
contributes to a project that is life enhancing (the value is vindicated), or life denying 
(the value is discarded). How should we understand this? Drawing on Max Weber’s32 
 
30 Broackes, J.  (2012) ‘Introduction’, in Broackes, J. (2012) Iris Murdoch, Philosopher (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press), 12-13. 
31 Murdoch, I. (1967) The Sovereignty of Good over other Concepts, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
97. 
32 Weber, M (2002) Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London, Penguin Books, translated 




reflections on the predicament of us moderns, Katsafanas argues that Nietzsche’s 
practical orientation culminates in a nihilistic diagnosis that fails to take any existing 
values as worthwhile ends in themselves. He writes: 
 
To put it in Nietzschean terms: our current perspective, with its commitments 
to an ideal of efficiency, continually structures our ways of viewing the world 
and our habits of thinking, such that reflections on the possibility of non-
instrumental value can be, for most individuals, only difficult reminders that 
are not put into everyday practice.33 
 
There seems to be a conflation here between value and the subjective conditions for 
valuation. It is one thing to say that value-sensitive creatures set themselves ends or 
purposes. It is quite another thing to say that how agents set values as their ends or 
goals in the course of deliberation about what to do determines what makes 
something a value. The conflation, as Alan Thomas 34  notes, and as Christine 
Korsgaard35 pointed out before him, is to run together two separate distinctions: value 
‘for its own sake’ versus ‘instrumental’ value; and ‘intrinsic’ versus ‘extrinsic’ value. 
The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction applies to values and what makes something a value; 
the latter applies to how agent set values as their ends or goals in the course of 
deliberation about what to do. If this is right, we may follow Thomas and be open to 
complementing Nietzsche’s account of how the free spirits are supposed to revalue 
 
33  Katsafanas, P. (forthcoming) “Nietzsche and Murdoch on the Moral Significance of Perceptual 
Experience”, forthcoming in the European Journal of Philosophy. [p. 20]. 
34  Thomas, A. (2012) ‘Nietzsche and Moral Fictionalism’, in C. Janaway and S. Robertson (eds.), 
Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 133-159, 134.  




the old values and set themselves ends or purposes in ways compatible with 
Murdoch’s moral realism. 36  We have already the comparison with versions of 
subjective realism. In what follows I focus on an alternative strategy based on the 
notion of situated representation (of a certain sort). 
 
4. Concepts and Conceptions 
According to Murdoch’s notion of moral vision, when people disagree about moral 
questions, their disagreements do not partition cleanly into evaluative and non-
evaluative categories; it is rather that the disputants’ different worldviews generate 
conflicting narratives about the situation. Moreover, our occurrent experiences and 
judgments, particularly about value, are informed by our background concepts and 
conceptions of those concepts (akin to what the aforementioned cognitive 
penetrability thesis predicts). Moral vision arises out of a total worldview. A narrative 
like the one we find in Murdoch’s rich descriptions of M (the mother in the story) 
frames the objects of evaluative appraisal, where the framing is a result of selection, 
prioritisation and organisation not only on behalf of the author but also the 
participating reader. For example, on one narrative, an individual is described as shy; 
but on another, as aloof. Because so many different narratives are often possible, 
some philosophers naturally worry that the narratives are never revealing moral 
reality but only constructing it. It is however a mistake to think that radical 
 
36 Indeed, as Thomas notes, we may develop a further account of the ‘subject’ end of Nietzsche’s 
critique of slave morality: “we we might, as a culture, not fail to find values but, rather, fail to find any 
values worth setting as our goals or ends. In explaining the latter claim evaluative realism is not 
repudiated but, again, rather presupposed. However, it is a subjective realism in which conditions on 
the subject are allowed to enter into an account of the nature of value in a non-reductive way.” 





subjectivism is entailed by the fact of different narratives because these are 
conceptions of the object of inquiry, not the object itself. There is no implication, or 
so I claim, for the meaning or nature of the object of evaluative appraisal from the fact 
of different narratives. 
One is easily led to suspicion of narrative explanation as a genuine form of 
explanation by exaggerating the role of interpretation. Taking a leaf from Peter 
Goldie’s work on historical and autobiographical narratives, part of the problem is that 
the suspicion that putative ‘supporting documents for any such particular narrative 
are “just more text, multiply open to interpretation” motivates the assimilation of 
narratives and what they are about’. 37  Transposed to the present case, the 
exaggeration about interpretation is the simple point that all these salient features 
pointed to in making good some particular appraisal are themselves open to radically 
open-ended interpretation in line with the individual viewer’s experience and, so the 
constructivist argument would continue, “meaning-making” propensities.  
The idea of narrative as revelatory of significance can be brought into sharper 
focus by comparison with Wittgenstein’s idea of a ‘perspicuous representation’ as 
being a key aspect of the task of philosophy as he sees it: offering a model of 
comparison that ‘earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things’ (PI 
§122) in order to achieve a ‘clear view’ of that which is troubling us (PI §133).38 
However this does not mean that there is some single philosophical method through 
which this is achieved. On the contrary, Wittgenstein presents the philosopher with 
an open-ended range of conceptual tools and techniques that can be used in a variety 
 
37 Goldie, P. (2012) The Mess Inside, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 153-54. 
38 Wittgenstein, L. (1963), Philosophical Investigations, tr. Anscombe, G. E. M., 2nd ed., Oxford, Blackwell 




of different ways including (but not limited to): offering ‘objects of comparison’ and 
presenting ‘alternative pictures’; pointing out particular ‘family resemblances’ and 
‘neglected aspects’ of our language; grammatical analysis of our use of language in 
practice, and so on. The real task at hand is to discern which method available to one 
is the most pointful in each context of critical appraisal for attaining clarity and reveal 
meaning – to which “whatever it takes” would be the only answer to give in the 
abstract. 39 
Now, in terms of what we may think of how Murdoch’s and Wittgenstein’s 
methods look in practice, one is reminded of Frank Sibley’s notion of “perceptual 
proof” in aesthetic evaluations. 40  The focus of Sibley’s discussion in his ‘General 
Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics’41 is Michael Scriven’s scepticism about what he 
calls the ‘independence requirement’ on aesthetic evaluation.42 The independence 
requirement is a demand on rational (aesthetic) thought that ‘we must be able to 
know the reason or reasons for a conclusion without first having to know the 
 
39  The meaning of the notion a ‘perspicuous representation’ is controversial within Wittgenstein 
scholarship. Read and Hutchinson argue that the notion of a perspicuous representation is not to be 
understood as a way of seeing things and there cannot be multiple perspicuous ways of seeing the rules 
of ‘our grammar’; any difference we might perceive between multiple perspicuous representations of 
an area of our grammar is merely a difference in how they are selected and arranged, something that 
can vary depending on the purpose of the investigation. Whether or not this is the best representation 
of Wittgenstein’s position falls beyond the scope of this paper. I am inclined to agree with Currie, G. 
(1993) ‘Interpretation and Objectivity’, Mind, 102 , 413–28 (who in turn follows John McDowell) that a 
representation (as used in ordinary contexts) that transcends any point of view seems incoherent, but 
I cannot argue for this claim here. For further discussion see, e.g., Moore, A. W. (1997) Points of View, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press; Baker, G. (2006) Wittgenstein’s Method: Neglected Aspects, London, 
Blackwell; Read, R. and Hutchinson, P. (2008) ‘Toward a Perspicuous Presentation of “Perspicuous 
Presentation’’, Philosophical Investigations 31 (2), 141-160.  
40 Sibley first introduced the notion of a ‘perceptual proof’ in his seminal article ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, 
footnote 23. Sibley, F. (1959/2001) ‘Aesthetic Concepts’, Philosophical Review 68 (4): 421-450. 
Reprinted in J. Benson, B. Redfern, and J. Roxbee Cox, (eds.) (2001) Approach to Aesthetics: Collected 
Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics by Frank Sibley, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001, 1-23. 
41 Sibley, F. (1983/2001) ‘General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics’, in Beardsley, M. C. and Fisher, J. 
(eds.), Essays on Aesthetics: Perspectives on the Work of Monroe C. Beardsley, Philadelphia, Temple 
University Press, 3-20. Reprinted in J. Benson, B. Redfern, and J. Roxbee Cox, (eds.) (2001), 104-118. 




conclusion; otherwise we can never get the reason as a means to the conclusion.’43 In 
its strongest form, the independence requirement demands that reasons must be 
logically prior to aesthetic verdicts (as opposed to temporally prior in perception). Like 
Wittgenstein before him, Sibley does not attempt a refutation of the sceptic by way 
of showing the independence requirement could be met. Instead he effectively uses 
the strategy of offering a ‘perspicuous representation’ of art criticism by pointing to 
the way it is actually practiced to show that aesthetic evaluations stand in no need for 
external validation. He writes: 
 
How a critic manages by what he says and does to bring people to see aesthetic 
qualities they have missed has frequently puzzled writers. But there is no real 
reason for mystification. […] What mainly is required is a detailed description 
of the sorts of thing critics in fact do and say, for this is what succeeds if 
anything does; the critic may make similes and comparisons, describe the work 
in appropriate metaphors, gesticulate aptly and so on. Almost anything he may 
do, verbal or non-verbal, can on occasion prove successful. To go on to ask how 
these methods can possibly succeed is to begin to ask how people can ever be 
brought to see aesthetic (and Gestalt and other similar) properties at all.44  
 
Thus, for Sibley and Wittgenstein, there is no one method of how we ought to do 
philosophy, but rather we employ a range of different tools that fit the task at hand; 
 
43 Sibley, F. (1983/2001) ‘General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics’, in M. C. Beardsley and J. Fisher 
(eds.), Essays on Aesthetics: Perspectives on the Work of Monroe C. Beardsley, Philadelphia, Temple 
University Press, 3-20. Reprinted in J. Benson, B. Redfern and J. Roxbee Cox, op. cit: 104-118, 115. 
44 Sibley, F. (1965/2001) ‘Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic’, Philosophical Review 74 (2): 135-159. Reprinted 




whatever it takes. As mentioned earlier (introductory section 1), a central feature of 
Murdoch’s account of moral vision, in turn, is that the recognition that moral 
philosophers, when presenting themselves as studying a specific issues in moral 
philosophy, are in fact always relying on background beliefs about the world that are, 
themselves, contestable.45 
But what is the analogue conception of value that this new way of seeing the 
matter of meaning brings with it?  
What needs explaining is a way in which agents could, as Murdoch puts it, “see 
different worlds”. What assumptions do we need to add to the presence, or possibility, 
of variation in narratives and worldviews to make the slide from moral vision to value 
constitutivism seem tempting? A crucial constraint here is that the commitment to 
Murdoch’s idea of a difference in comprehensive worldview, and not just mere 
variation in individual moral belief and preference, should play an important role in 
tempting us. Recall Murdoch’s objection to Hare’s presentation as primarily a matter 
of choice that we discussed in section 3, where Hare thinks of moral disagreement as 
a matter of difference in the ways in which people ‘choose’ among alternatives (and 
not as a disagreement in competing visions implied by to the concept of ‘worldview’). 
Here is a different way to ask the same basic question. 46  Why might value 
constitutivism seem less tempting on the view that accepts variation but denies moral 
vision? 
Recall Thomas’s (2012) remarks to the effect that those who slide from moral 
 
45  For further discussion of this issue, see e.g. Wiggins, D. (1989); Väyrynen, P. (2014b) ‘Essential 
Contestability and Evaluation’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3), 471-488. 
46 Suppose that we reject Murdoch’s idea of moral vision. This might be because we go in for a picture 
of moral concepts, thought, and experience more in line with R.M. Hare or G.E. Moore. I thank Michael 




vision to value constitutivism tend to conflate “value and the subjective conditions of 
valuation” (see section 3). I argue that Kastafanas’ use of the notion of ‘variation in 
perspective’ masks a similar ambiguity that betrays a deeper confusion between 
concepts and conceptions in Nietzsche’s perspectivism. On the one hand there is the 
familiar variation in subjective conditions of valuation: people set themselves different 
goals and live their lives in accordance with such decisions. On the other hand, there 
is a putative variation in the concepts themselves. In sum, Katsafanas’ Nietzschean 
constitutivism adopts a Kantian story about concepts structuring experience, but 
rejects the claim that these concepts are fixed and uniform for all rational agents; 
instead, they change over time. Moreover, he claims that although conceptual 
schemes can be ranked as better and worse, there is no one best or correct set of 
concepts.47 
The last claim is a departure from Hegel who, like Nietzsche, but unlike Kant, 
argues that the conceptual schemes through which we experience the world, the 
schemes that on the account structure our most basic understandings of ourselves 
and our relations to the world, are historically fluid. Katsafanas gives us the example 
of imagining a creature that cognizes things without seeing them as causally 
conditioned; or, imagine an agent that reasons practically while lacking any 
understanding of perfect and imperfect duty. These agents would, on the account, 
have experiences sufficiently dissimilar to us that it would make sense to speak of 
them as “seeing different worlds”.48 
Hegel, as Dancy notes, combines this claim that contingencies of the parochial 
 
47  Katsafanas, P. (forthcoming) “Nietzsche and Murdoch on the Moral Significance of Perceptual 





may enter into our model of objectivity with a vindicatory story about conceptual 
change: he proposes a method of stepping back from the human standpoint in a way 
such that our conceptual schemes are progressively more adequate. 49  As Dancy 
explains this Hegelian notion of objectivity, ‘nothing is “left behind” in this process; 
rather, each succeeding view is retained (if perhaps somewhat altered)’.50  Nietzsche, 
by contrast, dispenses with this Hegelian story of moral progress, opening us to the 
possibility that later conceptual schemes might be regressive and impoverished rather 
than more “refined”, as per Murdoch’s account (recall the idea of moral vision as ‘just 
and loving’ that was outlined in Section 1).51  
It is worth pausing to note that, on my reading, although Nietzsche and 
Murdoch both hold that there may be irreconcilable differences in competing 
worldviews (thus understood as conceptual schemes) this does not yet show that both 
authors hold that there is therefore no guarantee that we will arrive at a fully 
adequate, unproblematic set of concepts. Katsafanas, by contrast, moves from the 
claim that the fact that there may irreconcilable differences in our conceptual scheme 
to the additional claim that value itself is perspectival, that there are no genuine 
evaluative concepts (thus understood in cognitivist terms as picking out genuine 
properties of things). 
Now, recall Nietzsche’s distinctive account of the continuous process of 
revaluation. The central motivation for Nietzsche’s account of revaluation consists in 
examining the distinctly practical considerations of a value or commitment or concept 
 
49 Dancy, J. (1993), Moral Reasons, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 144-165. 
50 Dancy, J. (1993)), Moral Reasons, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 147. 
51 For further discussion of Hegel’s method as applied to evaluative thought and judgement, see Moore 




in terms of whether it contributes to a project that is life affirming, or life denying. 
How should we understand this idea of practical agency in relation to the property of 
being attuned to our human perspective, which also motivates Murdoch’s claim of 
worldviews being revelatory of value?  
In what follows I will speak of narrative structure in moral experience as 
making certain reasons available to the agent, where the concept of ‘narrative’ is to 
be understood as something fundamentally perspectival. I will use this noncommittal 
formulation deliberately in order to avoid more theoretically loaded models of the 
relationship between the normative content of ethics and practical agency, and the 
general notion of deliberating ‘from a personal point of view’. A familiar 
representative theoretical model of the relation between the moral agent and ethical 
values uses the idea of agent-neutral reasons for action. This is a standard way of 
understanding the idea that a reason stands in a special relation to a particular agent 
or class of agents (see Scheffler;52 Kagan;53 and Nagel54). However, understanding 
point of view as a determinant of a special class of agent-relative reasons or values 
that contrasts with another class of values or reasons determined by the impartial 
perspective is entirely optional, and not something that I myself endorse. Instead, we 
may think of point of view as an agent’s standpoint on an independent reality 
(evaluative or otherwise) such that the concept of a worldview identifies something 
 
52 Scheffler, S. (1982) ‘Ethics, Personal Identity and Ideals of the Person’, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 12 (2), 229-246. 
53 Kagan, S. (1989) The Limits of Morality, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 




that makes value available to an agent’s judgement rather than being a determinant 
of value itself.55  
A second feature of my use of the notion of moral vision is that the relevant 
sense of ‘narrative’ be treated as a transcendental condition in understanding the 
significance of the first-person perspective, as opposed to a feature of the object of 
critical evaluation itself. More specifically, in suggesting that value is in some sense 
always value for us, my claim is that perspectivalism be seen as transcendental 
condition for experience itself rather than a determinant of the representational 
content of such experience. Here I side with Goldie and Solomon, who warn against 
confusing the notion of autographical narrative with its intentional object.56 
According to my thesis about moral vision and the target concept of ‘point of 
view’, subjectivity is not a dissociable aspect of our mental lives as embodied agents, 
but a transcendental pre-condition for all conscious experience. By contrast, other 
authors57 reserve the phrase ‘sense of agency’ to refer to what Bayne and Pacherie,58 
in a different context, call ‘agentive judgements’. Bayne and Pacherie draw a 
distinction between agential experience and agentive judgement in what they refer to 
 
55 It could further be argued that agent-neutral value is incompatible with an independently attractive 
account of the nature of practical reasoning as reasoning that terminates in action as its conclusion. 
That will not be my focus here, but I will explore a different route to essentially the same claim in 
defending my position that discernment is a form of practical rationality expressive of first-personal 
thinking. See Thomas, A. (2005) ‘Reasonable Partiality and the Personal Point of View’, Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice 8, 25-43; and Dancy, J. (1993) Moral Reasons, Oxford, Blackwell. 
56 See Goldie, P. (2012) The Mess Inside, Oxford, Oxford University Press; and Solomon, M. (2015) 
Making Medical Knowledge, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Goldie expresses the point thus: “…it is 
sometimes suggested that life, or parts of life, such as an illness or a process of grieving is a narrative. 
This is a simple mistake that, I think, often leads to the worry that real life narratives are fundamentally 
no different from fictional narratives […]. There can be such a thing as a narrative of a life or of an illness 
or of a grieving, but to say that a life or an illness or a grieving is a narrative is to run together what is 
represented with the representation.” (pp. 153-4, Goldie, P. (2012).) 
57 Stephens, G. L., and Graham, G. (2000) When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted 
Thoughts, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
58 Bayne, T. and Pacherie, E. (2007) ‘Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-




as the ‘architecture of agentive self-awareness’, which suggests a potential 
rapprochement between the top-down narrative construction and other low-level 
‘vehicles’ for agentive self-awareness. On this approach, while the top-down narrative 
module has a role to play in explaining agentive judgements, there is a second 
dimension to the ‘mode’ of agentive awareness located in the very machinery of 
action production. They write: 
 
Think of what it is like to push a door open. One might judge that one is the 
agent of this action, but this judgment is not the only way in which one’s own 
agency is manifested to oneself; indeed, it is arguably not even the primary 
way in which one’s own agency is manifested to oneself. Instead, one 
experiences oneself as the agent of this action. Such states are no more 
judgments than are visual experiences of the scene in front of one or 
proprioceptive experiences of the current position of one’s limbs.59 
 
Theorists disagree as to whether such pre-reflexive (and maybe also pre-linguistic) 
experiences are themselves part of agentive self-hood, sometimes referred to as ‘the 
minimal self’. Gallagher’s60 formulation of the minimal model is premised upon a 
phenomenological account of self-awareness that involves a commitment to what is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘self-reflexivity thesis’. According to this thesis, 
consciousness always already implies a tacit form of self-awareness; Stephens and 
 
59 Bayne, T. and Pacherie, E. (2007) ‘Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-
Awareness’, Synthese 159, 475-491, p. 476. 
60  Gallagher, S. (2000) ‘Self-Reference and Schizophrenia: A Cognitive Model of Immunity to Error 
Through Misidentification’, in Zahavi, D. (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological 




Graham reserve the phrase ‘sense of agency’ to refer to agentive judgements.61 To 
forestall possible confusion, because nothing in this paper hangs on the plausibility of 
the stronger reading of minimal self-awareness as implying the reflexivity thesis, I 
follow Bayne and Pacherie in using the term ’agentive awareness’ to cover both 
readings.  
What matters for present purposes in relation to Bayne and Pacherie’s work 
on the interplay of top-down and bottom-up effects in the so-called architecture of 
agential awareness is a potential integration of the top-down narrative construction 
of selfhood and the minimal approach at one point: it suggests that (resistant) 
evaluative experience are best seen against the background of agency of whole 
persons. Katsafanas’s model of “value/meaning-making”, by contrast, opens the door 
to something more: to the prospect that we can see value content as determined by 
independently specifiable conceptual frameworks, patterns of attention, or on a 
larger scale, generic socio-political cultural narratives that are discernible in public 
discourse. This seems to me to be the central upshot of Nietzschean constitutivism. In 
so far as the promises of a reappraisal of Murdoch’s account lies in such a reduction 
of meaning and value to a perspective, it is a new paradigm I think we should resist. 
And the reason is that we should distinguish conditions on the valuing subject from 
conditions on the associated value.   
 
5. The Parochial and the Perspectival 
 
61 Stephens, G. L., and Graham, G. (2000) When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted 




So far I have sought to show that we can make sense of Murdoch’s claim that 
worldviews can reveal value without committing ourselves either to Platonism or 
Nietzschean constitutivism. The suggestion was that moral vision puts pressure on us 
to have a conception of value according to which what is valuable is not valuable from 
the point of view of the universe but valuable for us. Although moral vision on its own 
is largely neutral to the question of the nature of value, my position is that Murdoch’s 
notion of the concept ultimately fits best with a conception of value that is in some 
sense perspectival (although not in the radical sense entailed by constitutivism) rather 
than Platonic. This raises a number of questions concerning the relation between 
moral vision and the notion of non-perspectival value with which we started.  
On my account, the property of being attuned to a human perspective has to 
do with the nature of value rather than the nature of evaluative thought or 
experience. It is worth pausing to note the difference between this reading of 
Murdoch’s claim that worldviews can reveal value and an alternative epistemic 
construal whereby the perspectivalness of value thesis is defined as a feature of 
Murdochian moral vision. If the central notion of perspective were understood as 
epistemic in this way, the resulting account of moral vision would trivially rule out 
Platonism (since moral vision and Platonism would just be defined in incompatible 
ways.)62 By contrast, my impression is that some value is non-perspectival just in case 
it does not depend on human perspectives and worldviews for its existence. To 
illustrate, if value were non-perspectival, then vision of value would be analogous to 
vision of objects such as, say, pine trees (e.g., a Scots pine). Pine trees don’t depend 
 




on human perspectives or worldviews for their existence, although our human 
sensibilities are capable of perceiving them.  
Now, on the face of it, if I am right that the notion of non-perspectival value is 
better understood in metaphysical terms, does it not follow that the concept of 
perspectival value is value that does metaphysically depend on human perspectives 
and worldviews for its existence? No. We can talk of perspectival value in different 
ways. It might mean that value is fixed by our actual perspectives and worldviews, 
whatever those happen to be. This would lead to a highly subjectivist picture. But 
there is space for an alternative view. The alternative says that value would not exist 
but for creatures with perspectives and worldviews, but actual perspectives and 
worldviews can be mistaken. Such perspectival value is for us, and we can be better 
or worse at detecting it. To see this, it is helpful to turn to more theoretically loaded 
models of the relationship between the normative content of ethics and practical 
agency, and the general notion of deliberating ‘from a perspective’, in the debate over 
partiality and impartiality in ethics.  
Suppose that all values are eudaimonistic and constitutively connected to 
human flourishing: there are no values that do not stand in a constitutive relation to 
a mental subject. One option is to say that content and human-involving interests are 
interdependent: neither can be understood except in connection with the other. As 
Alan Thomas puts it, ‘we respond to value and yet everything relevant to our 
subjective [human] perspective can bear on the process of evaluation and hence what 
those eudaimonistic values mean for us’.63 Thomas maintains that the correct way to 
 
63  Thomas, A. (2012). ‘Nietzsche and Moral Fictionalism’, in C. Janaway and S. Robertson (eds.), 




conceive of this value is, indeed, presuppositionally. It does not enter into the truth 
conditions of an evaluative claim that such claims are relativized to the human 
standpoint.64 Secondly, even within subjective realism, there is still an ambiguity in 
understanding the relationship between us and these facts. Suppose we appropriately 
respond to something: 
 
i. Do we react as we do because the world is such as to merit the reaction? This 
suggests robust realism. 
ii. Is the world such as to merit the reaction because we react in these ways? This 
suggests projectivism or quasi-realism. 
 
John McDowell denies both directions of explanation for the class of eudaimonistic 
values. He says that neither our reactions nor the facts we are reacting to can be 
understood apart from each other: they are both basic, and fit one another. He calls 
this the No Priority View: we respond to value and yet everything relevant to our 
(human) perspective can bear on the process of valuing and hence what those 
eudaimonistic values mean for us. As McDowell puts: ‘If there is no comprehending 
the right sentiments independently of the concepts of the relevant [evaluative] 
features, a no-priority view is surely indicated.’65 This brings me to a related distinction 
between value and evaluation, which bears directly on Katsafanas’ discussion of 
genealogy that I discussed earlier (see Sections 1 and 4).  
 
64 Thomas gives the following example: “Postboxes are not red for humans; postboxes are red. In the 
latter claim the perspectivalness of colour discourse as a whole is presupposed’ – and similarly for the 
notion of value relative to our human perspective.” (Thomas, A. (2012), 150) 
65 McDowell, J. (1987) ‘Projection and Truth in Ethics’, reprinted in McDowell J. (1998) Mind, Value, and 




Rather than holding that the conceptual schemes through which we 
experience the world literally structure the intentional object of human thought and 
judgement in a way that implies that agents with dissimilar worldviews see different 
worlds (because the schemes that shape our basic understanding of ourselves and our 
relations to the world are historically fluid), I suggest that we may think of conceptual 
frameworks as models of comparison, deployed in the interests of uncovering 
meaning and value in a way that is perhaps analogous to the very activity of 
philosophy itself. Maybe the question of what exactly is to be understood in the 
continuous task of setting oneself goals and living one’s life in accordance with those 
decisions is itself an ill posed question, and that it is this ‘dislodging’ of ideas that 
aspects of Murdoch’s difficult work endeavours to illuminate.66 If we may think of 
ethical and aesthetic vindication as taking on this task (as Wittgenstein does with 
philosophy), we can also preserve a critical perspective in favour of a purely 
sociological or autobiographical one.  
Such reorientation of focus makes available a distinctive mode of criticism, in 
which claims to ‘objective’ meaning in conceptual frameworks are criticised not as 
false per se, but as failing to yield the insight about the problem of objective meaning 
it was the point of those claims to provide. The conceptual framework of one’s ‘life-
world’ can reveal (or obfuscate) the object’s meaning – but it does not determine the 
object’s meaning. To think otherwise would be to conflate what is represented with 
the representation. 
 
66 This seems to be Cora Diamond’s reading of Murdoch, but it is difficult to be sure. See Diamond, C. 
(1996) ‘’We are perpetually moralists’: Iris Murdoch, Fact, and Value', in Antonaccio, M. and Schweiker, 





To make good this claim we may follow the basic tactic of Adrian Moore’s 
defence of ‘absolute representations’, representations that can be added without 
danger of conflicting points of view, and distinguish between the conditions of the 
production of a representation on the one hand and ‘the role that the representation 
can play in such process as indirect integration’ on the other.67  The central claim 
would be that the perspectivalness of the production of a representation, expressive 
of an answerable stance upon the world that (at least in the evaluative case) includes 
the history of whatever conceptual apparatus that is used in it, has no effect on the 
stance-independence of the latter.68  
Just how we should best understand the relation of the parochial to that of an 
absolute conception of the world is something that I leave open for future work. The 
claim here is simply that the “producer” of an evaluative representation has a point 
of view operative in producing it; the context of the agent betrays a stance upon the 
world. This preserves a critical stance, in as much as we are now in a position to hold 
that the route to ethical truth will be stance-dependent, shaped by one’s conceptions, 
and yet think of competing conceptual frameworks as offering different perspectives 
on the object of inquiry – without thereby reducing meaning and truth to a 
perspective. 
In this section I have argued that the emphasis placed on context that is 
present in both Katsafanas’ and Murdoch’s accounts of value experience as always 
 
67 Moore, A. W. (1997) Points of View, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 89. 
68 Moore writes: “One attractive feature of this tactic is that it leaves considerable room for concession 
whenever anyone insists on the parochial, conditioned, nay, perspectival character of any act of 
producing a representation. They are right to insist on this, if it is properly understood. Apart from 
anything else, any act of producing a representation in an act, and agency itself is impossible without 
some (evaluative) point of view giving sense to the question of what to do. But one possible thing to 




already structured by the concepts and parochial sensibilities at one’s disposal 
effectively declares content-involving (and so rationality-involving) phenomena in 
human life to be inseparable from point or purpose. Katsafanas’ Nietzschean value 
constitutivism was motivated by the thought that the emphasis on point or purpose 
must presuppose that facts about the valuer enter into the reflective explanation of 
the truth conditions of ethical claims in ways that render them radically perspectival. 
But this conclusion is premature: the general non-Platonist idea that evaluative claims 
are ‘perspectival’ is ambiguous between a number of readings that we should be 
careful to distinguish.  
In the next section, I consider the possible objection whether the present 
account can make sense of the notion of structure and unity of moral thought: are 
there any limits as to what might plausibly be counted as “value for us”?  
 
6. Thick Concepts and the Unity of Evaluative Thought 
Murdochian moral vision, recall, says roughly that our experiences and beliefs about 
the world do not partition cleanly into evaluative and non-evaluative categories; and, 
moreover, our occurrent experiences and judgments, particularly about value, are 
informed by our background concepts and conceptions of those concepts. Moral 
vision arises out of a total worldview.  
Now consider the following concern. Intuitively, our worldviews give rise to 
perceptual experiences and beliefs about ostensibly non-perspectival objects, 
properties, and relations, such as pine-trees, causal relations, chairs, and so on. The 
worry is whether my account of moral vision requires us to radically rethink, say, 




This would be an unwelcome result. For the natural answer here is that this is 
implausible. For example, it seems as if there could be causation even if there were 
no comprehensive worldviews in my sense; this was the key motivation for resisting 
the epistemic construal of the target notion. Conversely, on my metaphysical 
approach according to which some value is non-perspectival just in case it does not 
depend on human perspectives and worldviews for its existence, if value were non-
perspectival, then vision of value would be analogous to vision of objects such as 
flowers (e.g. a wood anemone). Wood anemones don’t depend on human 
perspectives or worldviews for their existence, although our human sensibilities are 
(thankfully) capable of perceiving them.  
So far, so good. The deeper issue is what, if anything, identifies any (thick) 
concept as a distinctly evaluative concept. The problem here is this. Even if Murdoch’s 
idea that we cannot clearly separate evaluative and non-evaluative categories in the 
deployment of a worldview is right, we still do seem to be able to identify some things 
as purely non-evaluative; causation, for instance. What, on the account, could justify 
such distinctions? Is there room for the very concept of the unity and structure of 
evaluative thought as such? 
There are a number of options here. One possibility is to adopt a broadly 
pragmatist stance and say that a flattened moral landscape is no bad thing; maybe 
some version of the normative reading Wittgenstein, such as that of Alice Crary, to 
the effect that linguistic competence is a moral or evaluative competence is true.69 
Another option is to work with the particularist notion of a ‘default’ moral reason and 
 




say that although there is nothing intrinsic about any feature that makes it a moral 
reason, this does not imply that we cannot distinguish the concept of a (moral) reason 
from that of context. 70  A third option is to think further about thick evaluative 
concepts.  
In what follows I will focus on two recent trends in meta-ethics. One is the 
renewed interest in the non-reductive cognitivist conception of thick evaluative 
concepts such as kind or cruel as non-evaluatively shapeless with respect to the lower-
level properties that ground them. The second is the preoccupation with arguments 
in the philosophy of language as applied to meta-ethics, notably the rule-following 
argument and debates over semantic contextualism. As we shall see, these two trends 
are not unconnected. What is distinctive about the contextualist version of non-
reductive moral realism is a shift in focus from the orthodox view that CRUEL 
conceptually entails good (inherent evaluation in meaning) to that of semantic under-
determination in evaluative property ascription. 
The initial worry with the new version of non-reductive moral realism is that 
the general notion of linguistic competence, which also motivates the outrunning 
thesis that was mentioned in the Introduction, does not seem to capture what, if 
anything, makes a (class of) thick concept evaluative. In response, defenders of the 
claim that thick concepts are inherently evaluative, and not evaluative in virtue of 
standing in an analytic or conceptual relation of entailment to some thin evaluative 
concept, can instead appeal to the claim that thick concepts require an “evaluative 
 
70 For further discussion and defense of such an approach, see Dancy passim; Bergqvist, A. (2009) 
‘Semantic Particularism and Linguistic Competence’, Logique et Analyse 52 (208), 343-361; and 
Bergqvist, A. (2010) ‘Why Sibley is Not a Generalist After All’, The British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1), 1-
14. For a different argument to a similar conclusion, see Chappell, S. G. (2013) ‘There Are No Thin 




eye”, sensitivity to human practical concerns, to determine or recognise their 
instances.71 Thus, for instance, Debbie Robert’s (2013) version72 of the thesis that thick 
concepts are inherently evaluative is formulated as a claim about what makes a 
concept evaluative in terms of property ascription, where the notion of ‘ascribing an 
evaluative property’ in using thick concepts is distinguished from Eklund’s notion of a 
concept being evaluative in virtue of standing for an evaluative property. 73  The 
distinction serves to highlight different ways of picking out the property in question: a 
direct, non-dependent way, and a parasitic one. Following Kit Fine,74 Roberts further 
elucidates the notion of ascribing an evaluative property ‘directly’ in using thick 
concepts as a matter of latching onto one of its essential, rather than accidental, 
features given by the real definition for the kind in question which again brings us back 
to the shapelessness thesis, the thesis that what constitutes the real similarity shared 
by all instances of the concept in question, is evaluative – thus understood as a claim 
about the semantic values of thick concepts rather than their linguistic meaning: 
‘evaluation determines extension in the case of evaluative concepts, because 
evaluative concepts and properties are non-evaluatively shapeless’.75  
The problem with this tactic as I see it is this. Even if formulated as a claim 
about the extension (semantic values) of thick concepts, and not just the meanings (or 
senses), the general notion of shapelessness does not seem to distinguish specifically 
evaluative concepts from other concepts ascribing emergent or metaphysically 
 
71 Dancy, J. (2013) ‘Practical Concepts’, in Kirchin S. (2013), 44-59, p. 58. 
72 Roberts, D. (2013) ‘It’s Evaluation, Only Thicker’, in Kirchin S. (2013), 78-96. 
73 Eklund, M. (2013) ‘Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality’, in Kirchin S. (2013) 161-181. 
74 See Fine, K. (1994) ‘Essence and Modality’, Philosophical Perspectives 8, 1-16; and Fine, K. (1995) 
‘Ontological Dependence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95, 269-90. 




dependent properties. If all, or some, thick concepts really verify the thesis that thick 
concepts can be used as full evaluative judgements on their own and not indicate 
positive or negative thin evaluative judgement – and this cannot be explained as 
simply due to pragmatic factors – then one may question whether the relationship 
between thick concepts and evaluation is a semantic relationship.76 Moreover, as 
noted above, if a broadly Wittgensteinian conception of linguistic competence as 
normative per se is right, maybe the shapelessness hypothesis is true of all ‘higher-
level’ artefact and social kind terms and concepts.  
In general, and here I side with Pekka Väyrynen:77 either the relevant notion of 
shapelessness isn’t characteristic of the evaluative in particular (maybe it holds for 
mental concepts and properties as well?), in which case it is not clear why the thesis 
should carry the sorts of distinctive metaethical implications that get attributed to it. 
Or else the relevant notion of shapelessness (proper) is supposed to be characteristic 
of the evaluative in particular (contra Crary (2007), for instance), in which case it will 
be a problem for the inherent value thesis about thick concepts if shapelessness can 
be explained on the basis of more general factors that have nothing in particular to do 
with being evaluative.78 The upshot from this seems to be that something stronger 
than conceptual competence or inquiry is required for the identification of thick 
evaluative concepts as such.79 That also seems to the position of Jonathan Dancy, who 
 
76  For further discussion and defense of this claim, see Väyrynen, P. (2011). ‘Thick Concepts and 
Variability’, Philosopher’s Imprint 11 (1); and Bergqvist, A. (2013) ‘Thick Concepts and Context 
Dependence’, Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1). 
77 Väyrynen, P. (2014) ‘Shapelessness in Context’, Noûs 48, 573-93. 
78 Ibid. Reference to Crary mine; see Crary, A. (2007) Beyond Moral Judgement, Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press. 
79 Similarly Roberts claims that a property is evaluative if it is ‘anthropocentric’, where the relevant 
notion of ‘anthropocentric’ may further be elucidated in terms of a) response-dependency or else or as 
b) ‘being intrinsically linked to human concerns and purposes in terms of importance or mattering’. 




argues that we instead understand competence with thick concepts as a practical 
competence. He writes: 
  
[Competence with thick concepts] will be practical competence, since it 
consists in knowledge of the sorts of [reason-providing] difference it can make 
that it is here instantiated. This sort of knowledge brings with it the ability to 
tell one case from another in this respect; the competence is not just an ability 
to determine whether the concept is instantiated or not, but also the ability to 
determine what difference this makes on the present occasion.80 
 
The problem with this suggestion as an articulation of the thesis that thick evaluative 
concepts are (non-Platonically) inherently evaluative is that it seems possible for a 
non-evaluative concept to require the evaluative eye as well, in which case the 
evaluative nature of thick concepts is yet to be explained. Take Margaret Little’s 
example of noticing a child alone in the crowd. As Dancy notes, ‘while loneliness might 
be a thick concept, aloneness might not be, and one can imagine saying that it is a 
non-evaluative matter whether the child is accompanied or not’; yet, for all that, ‘the 
ability to notice such a thing requires an understanding of human practical 
purposes.’81  As noted by Siegel,82 Bengson (ms) gives an example of this sort in an 
excellent discussion of similar phenomena, where someone gives up their seat on the 
bus to someone else who is visibly tired (a pregnant or elderly person, for instance). 
 
80 Dancy, J. (2013) ‘Practical Concepts’, in S. Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 44-59. p. 58. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Siegel, S. (2014) ‘Affordances and the Contents of Perception’, in Brogaard, B. (ed.) (2014) Does 




Again, even if it is a wholly non-evaluative matter whether some person is visually 
tired or not, appreciating the action-oriented dimension of seeing someone in that 
state in one’s close proximity requires, precisely, the “evaluative” eye for human 
practical concerns.83 So how should we understand this? 
As we have seen, the revival of the non-reductive conception of thick concepts 
has gained fuel from arguments in the philosophy of language. There is a presentiment 
about, that the new version’s re-orientation promises to make non-reductive realism 
about moral properties a more viable meta-ethical position. While I am myself broadly 
sympathetic to the moral particularist contextualist position in metaethics, I argue 
that the recent semantic contextualist turn in the literature about thick evaluative 
concepts masks an ambiguity regarding the relation between competence with thick 
evaluative concepts and the fact that something is a moral property or reason, which 
I argue is helpfully elucidated further by clearly distinguishing the issue of what makes 
something an evaluative judgement and judgements concerning the applicability of 
given concepts. In my view, to determine whether some thick concept applies in a 
given context of evaluative appraisal is not as such to “make an evaluation” (other 
than the sense in which, e.g., aesthetic concepts may be seen as ‘taste concepts’ such 
that judgement of taste is logically prior to, and therefore can be used to explain, 
competence with thick aesthetic terms). We need a separate argument that speaks to 
the practicality of thick moral concepts as action-guiding concepts (compare worries 
 
83 John Bengson (ms) distinguishes the idea of feeling that an action is simply pulled out of you by the 
situation (in something like the way a reflex might be), from the feeling that it is pulled out of you by 
the situation, because the situation mandated it. As noted by Siegel, S. (2014), since Bengson wants to 
distinguish between actions, and reflexes aren’t actions, ultimately he glosses his distinction in terms 
of different levels or kinds of understanding of the situation that elicits (Bengson says “extorts”) the 




about competence above), and the notion of action-oriented perception more 
generally.84 
In the context of moral philosophy, Maximilian De Gaynesford argues that 
reference to the first person – first personal thought – in ethical thinking is of greatest 
importance in understanding the very notions of ‘rational agency’ (agency that 
involves responsiveness to reasons) and ‘practical reasoning’ (reasoning leading to 
action). As he puts it, ‘[u]nless some situation is mine, I am unable to recognise it as 
open to my agency or as relating me to various reason-giving facts. And unless some 
reasons are mine, I am unable to engage in reasoning that leads to action’.85 What is 
the relation of agency that discloses objects of evaluative appraisal as ‘open’ to me as 
a responsible moral judge?  
What I have tried to do in this section is to offer a new way of understanding 
the evaluative/non-evaluative distinction concerning the way that we think about the 
nature of thick concepts in terms all-encompassing world-views. Such reorientation of 
focus makes available a novel conception of thick evaluative concepts, in which the 
emphasis on underdetermined evaluative meaning in metaethics is criticized not as 
false per se, but as failing to yield the insight about the problem of an occasion-
 
84  For further discussion of this issue in relation to the debate over the admissible contents of 
perceptual experience, see e.g. Siegel, S. (2014) ‘Affordances and the Contents of Perception’, in B. 
Brogaard (ed. Does Perception Have Content? (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 51-75; Kelly, S. (2010). 
‘The Normative Nature of Perceptual Experience’, in B. Nanay (ed.) Perceiving the World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press); and, of course, Gibson, J. (1977). ‘The Theory of Affordances’. Reprinted in R. 
Shaw and J. Bransford (eds.) Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing (New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum, 1986): 
pp. 127-1XX. 
85 De Gaynesford, M. (2010) ‘The Bishop, the Chambermaid, the Wife and the Ass: What Difference 
Does it Make if Something is Mine?’, in J. Cottingham, P. Stratton-Lake, and B. Feltham, (eds.) Partiality 





insensitive semantics for the thick it was the point of that move to make in 
understanding moral properties. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This essay has critically explored the implications of Murdoch’s distinctive conception 
of value experience as conceptually structured in perspectival and parochial ways for 
the possibility of a value objectivism, with special emphasis on the so-called ‘absolute 
conception’ that is implicit in many contemporary debates about thick evaluative 
concepts. A popular moral cognitivist strand in the contemporary debate in the wake 
of the work of authors such as John McDowell and Bernard Williams is the non-
reductive subjective realist position that evaluative thought and judgement deploying 
such concepts be understood as anthropocentric (“subjective”). What I have sought 
to make good in this paper is the stronger robust realist claim that the salient concepts 
of an individual’s life-world can be revelatory of value, without appeal to Platonism 
(or value-constitutivism). Drawing on Iris Murdoch’s model of value experience and 
moral vision as implying the notion of an all-encompassing ‘worldview’, my central 
positive thesis is the claim that the relevant notion that value is always value for us be 
understood as a transcendental condition for experience itself rather than a 
determinant of the representational content of such experience. 
This, in view of the familiar concerns with G. E. Moore’s non-natural moral 
realism with which we started, raised a problem about the relation between moral 
vision and the notion of non-perspectival value. Against Katsafanas, I argued that 
commitment to the thesis that value is in some sense always value for us does not as 




any actual worldviews or perspectives. I have argued that the converse thesis is 
unsustainable due to the problems associated with the epistemic construal of 
perspectival and non-perspectival value, whereby the perspectivalness of value thesis 
is defined as a feature of Murdochian moral vision. And the reason is that we can still 
distinguish conditions on the valuing subject from conditions on the associated value. 
In developing my positive account of value experience as revelatory of value, I 
then went on to argue that we regard the salient notion of structure in moral 
experience, thus understood as implying an all-encompassing ‘worldview’, as an 
object of comparison. I further made the claim that the emphasis placed on context 
that is present in both Katsafanas’ and Murdoch’s accounts of value experience as 
always already structured by the concepts and parochial sensibilities is best 
understood as the claim that content-involving (and so rationality-involving) 
phenomena in human life is inseparable from point or purpose.  
This raised the objection about the structure and unity of moral thought and 
judgement as evaluative thought as such: are there any limits as to what might 
plausibly be counted as “value for us”? This question is especially pressing once we 
follow Murdoch and take the central target notion of worldview to be an unruly 
holistic admixture of evaluative and non-evaluative concepts. 
I considered, and rejected, a recent contextualist version of the non-reductive 
moral realist view of thick concepts according to which evaluative concepts are (non-
Platonically) inherently evaluative, and not evaluative in virtue of standing in an 
analytic or conceptual relation of entailment to some thin evaluative concept such as 
GOOD. Instead, I suggested that we re-consider the evaluative/non-evaluative 




terms of all-encompassing world-views.  
In my estimate, what is needed is a separate argument that speaks to the 
practicality of thick moral concepts as action-guiding concepts, and the notion of 
action-oriented perception more generally. Such reorientation of focus makes 
available a novel conception of thick concepts, in which the emphasis on 
underdetermined evaluative meaning in meta-ethics is criticized not as false per se, 
but as failing to yield the insight about the problem of an occasion-insensitive 
semantics for the thick it was the point of that move to make in understanding moral 
properties. 
Where does this leave us? If I am right, the general notion of shapelessness 
does not seem to distinguish specifically evaluative concepts from other concepts 
ascribing emergent or metaphysically dependent properties. But does that mean that 
we should reject the semantic contextualist inherent value thesis of thick concepts in 
favour of a broadly pragmatist one, or try to assimilate the two? Well, in one respect 
this is academic – it does not matter what name we give to the resulting theory. Having 
said this, it is still illuminating to see how putting pressure on polarised dichotomies 
(between the evaluative and non-evaluative, the subjective and objective) opens up 
new possibilities in understanding the significance of the notion of ‘point of view’ in 
value philosophy. The resulting options are either to think that a flattened evaluative 
landscape is no bad thing, or to develop something akin to the model of thick concepts 
as both situated and action-oriented that I have here begun to sketch.86  
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